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CASE COMMENTS

Constitutional Law-Indigents' Waiver of Counsel on Appeal
Petitioner, F, was arrested and charged with murder. Because
of his indigency, P secured court appointed counsel to represent
him. He was convicted of voluntary manslaughter. There were
no post trial motions filed on P's behalf, no appeal was taken from
the judgment of sentence and the time for filing such appeals had
expired. He thereafter petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, asserting that his trial counsel had declined to undertake an appeal
and that he had been without the funds or knowledge necessary
to perfect an appeal in the absence of such assistance. P contended
that although entitled to appellate review as of right, the refusal of
his appointed counsel to undertake the appeal thus effectively prevented him from exercising that right. The lower court dismissed
his petition without a hearing. Held, order vacated and case remanded for further proceedings. P may not be foreclosed from
exercising his right to appellate review of his conviction if his failure
to assert that right was the result of an unconstitutional deprivation
of the assistance of counsel, and a hearing must be held to inquire
into this question. Should it there be concluded that he had been
denied his right to counsel for an appeal, he must be permitted an
appeal as if timely filed, and counsel must be appointed to prosecute
the appeal. Commonwealth ex rel. Robinson v. Myers, 215 A.2d
637 (Pa. 1966).
The main question in the principal case was whether or not P had
waived his right to the assistance of counsel in securing appellate
review. To this question it is necessary to inquire into all the
circumstances attendant upon the failure to take a direct appeal.
An opinion in an earlier Pennsylvania case enumerated the circumstances which should be determined in this type inquiry. These
circumstances are as follows: whether the defendant was indigent
at the conclusion of his trial; whether he was informed of his right
to appeal by anyone; whether he independently knew of his right
to appeal; whether he desired to appeal; whether he communicated
a desire to his trial counsel that he wished to appeal; whether he
communicated such a desire to the trial court; and what the
reactions were of counsel or the court. Once these questions have
been answered, then the hearing court can determine whether
directly or indirectly, P was denied the assistance of counsel in
perfecting his appeal, whether a denial of counsel was a factor in
the failure to take an appeal or whether some other reason was in-
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volved which amounted to an intelligent and knowing waiver of
the right to appeal and the assistance of counsel. Commonwealth
ex rel. Stevens v. Myers, 419 Pa. 1, 213 A.2d 613 (1965).
The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment now
guarantees the assistance-of-counsel portions of the sixth amendment to defendants in state trials both in capital and noncapital
felonies. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The scope
of the right prior to conviction may be broad enough to require
counsel, under certain circumstances, at virtually any stage of
a felony proceeding. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)
(when the investigation centers on a particular suspect); White v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (preliminary hearing); Hamilton v.
Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961) (arraingment); Hudson v. North
Carolina,363 U.S. 697 (1960) (the middle of trial).
In Douglas v. California,372 U.S. 353 (1963), the Court held that
an indigent has the right to benefit of counsel on appeal. In the
Douglas case the Court was dealing only with the first appeal,
granted as a matter of right to rich and poor alike, from a criminal
conviction. It was not decided in the Douglas case whether a state
would have to provide counsel for an indigent seeking a discretionary hearing from a state's supreme court after an intermediate
court had sustained his conviction, nor whether counsel must be
appointed for an indigent seeking review of a state appellate court's
action in the federal courts. In the Douglas case the Court did
observe that a state can, consistently with the fourteenth amendment, provide for differences in appellate practices so long as the
result does not amount to a denial of due process or an invidious
discrimination. The Court said it could see no difference whether
the issue was the right to a free transcript on appeal or an indigent's right to assistance of counsel on appeal. To the Court in
either case the evil is the same: discrimination against the indigent.
The indigent had already been afforded some aid on appeal by
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), which held that Illinois was
obligated to furnish a free transcript to an indigent on appeal. The
Court stated that a state is not required by the federal constitution
to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all, but
if a state does grant appellate review it cannot do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of
their poverty.
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Other cases seem to fortell that additional assistance to the
indigent may yet appear. In United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Fay,
241 F. Supp. 165 (N.Y. 1965), the court held that New York's
decisional rule as to indigent appeals, violates the constitutional
rights of convicted indigents. The New York rule provided that trial
counsel assigned to an indigent in a non-capital case had no
responsibility for advising as to an appeal or filing a notice of
appeal and that the indigent could not secure counsel for appeal
except from the appellate court after timely filing of a notice of
appeal.
A recent Oklahoma case reached a result contrary to that in the
principal case. The Oklahoma case involved a proceeding for granting casemade (a casemade consists of those things which transpired
in court during the trial, and which are not a part of the record) at
public expense and allowing appeal to be filed out of time. The
petitioner was represented at the trial court by counsel of his own
choice. He stated in his petition that notice of intent to appeal was
given. However, neither he nor his family could raise the funds
for an attorney to perfect the appeal. After the time for appeal
had expired, the petitioner filed a request for a casemade at public
expense in the District Court of Oklahoma County, which was
denied. The Oklahoma court, with little discussion, said that
petitioner was not denied any constitutional rights; he merely failed
to take advantage of them in apt time. Gaforth v. Oklahoma, 407
P.2d 1001 (Okla. 1965).
In Carrell v. United States, 344 F.2d 537 (1965), the defendant
filed a motion for leave to file an appeal after the allowed time for
appeal had expired. He claimed in substance that his trial counsel
had failed to follow his instruction to file an appeal, of which failure
the defendant said he had been unaware. The court remanded for
a hearing to determine whether the defendant's failure to take a
timely appeal was to be excused. The court said that the right to
counsel is so critical to the basic right of appeal that one who is
without counsel and urges the claim must be offered the assistance
of counsel.
In another federal case, a prisoner petitioned for permission to
appeal in forma pauperis after the time for instituting an appeal
had expired. The petitioner had been represented at the trial by
his own retained counsel, but the petitioner claimed that his counsel
had never apprised him of his right to appeal. The court said that
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if these allegations were true and unexplained, it would constitute
such an extraordinary inattention to a client's interests as to amount
to ineffective assistance of counsel. The opinion continued by
saying that if the facts should be found to be as alleged, the court
should by the expedient of vacating and resentencing, restore the
prisoner to the status of one on whom sentence has just been imposed and who has ten days in which to institute an appeal.
Dillane v. United States, 350 F.2d 732 (1965). The view of the
court in the Dillane case could have far reaching effects if it were
to be adopted by the United States Supreme Court. As to what
extend such a holding would be applied is not known, but it has
been held that the rule of Douglas v. California, supra, has a
retroactive application. Ruark v. Colorado, 378 U.S. 585 (1964).
An intelligent waiver of counsel will probably continue to be accepted, but the failure to request counsel will probably not justify
the failure of the court to provide counsel for the indigent on trial
or appeal level. Day, The Right to Have Assistance of Council at
All Appellate Stages, 52 A.B.A.J. 135 (1966). The future may see
the Supreme Court requiring states to assume the indigent's burden
at any appellate stage.
The West Virginia Supreme Court recognizes that the right of
one accused of a crime to assistance of counsel is a fundamental
right, essential to a fair trial and made obligatory upon the states
by virtue of due process clause of the federal constitution; this right
is not presumed to have been waived by failure of the accused to
request counsel, by entry of a guilty plea or by reason of a record
silent on the matter of counsel. For a waiver of counsel to be
valid it must be made intelligently and understandingly. State ex
rel. Stumbo v. Boles, 139 S.E.2d 259 (W. Va. 1964).
A West Virginia statute provides that a transcript shall be
furnished indigent persons under conviction. W. VA. CODE ch. 51,
art. 7, § 7 (Michie 1961). In Linger v. Jennings, 143 W. Va. 57,
99 S.E.2d 740 (1957), the court regarded the statute as clear and
free from ambiguity and acceptable without resorting to any rule
of interpretation. In State ex rel. Legg v. Boles, 148 W. Va. 354,
135 S.E.2d 257 (1964), the court held that a convicted indigent
defendant is entitled to a free transcript of the record of his trial,
upon complying with the provisions of the statute, for use in seeking
an appeal, and refusal to furnish such transcript violates the
fourteenth amendment.
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In a very recent West Virginia case the convicted indigent informed the clerk of the circuit court that he desired a free transcript
for the purpose of seeking an appeal, but the clerk failed to furnish
the duly requested transcript in sufficient time to enable the
indigent to apply for an appeal. In a proceeding for habeas corpus
it was asserted that the petitioning indigent was not entitled to
relief in that he failed to satisfy the requirements of the statute
which requires the filing of a written request setting forth the
grounds upon which the appeal or writ of error would be sought.
The court held that the provision requiring a written request setting
forth the grounds for an appeal or writ of error is merely incidental
to the main purpose of the statute and elimination or disregard of
the provision would not defeat the legislative intent. In concluding
the court said that the failure of the circuit court, acting by its
clerk, to furnish a duly requested transcript in sufficient time to
enable such indigent to apply for an appeal, constitutes a denial of
due process of law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to
the federal constitution and by Article III, sections ten and seventeen of the West Virginia Constitution. State ex. rel. Kennedy v.
Bailes, 147 S.E.2d 391 (1966). W. VA. CoDE ch. 51, art. 7 § 7
(Michie 1961) was rewritten in 1965. The revision was an attempt
to coordinate it with the federal decisions in the area. The petitioner's claim in the Kennedy case arose before the revision, and the
1965 amendment was not involved in the case.
No case could arise in West Virginia which would be identical
with the principal case because there is no appeal as of right in
West Virginia. However, the situation may very well develop
in West Virginia in which a convicted indigent has not sought an
appeal or writ of error within the permitted time because he was
unaware of this right to seek an appeal. Then the question will
be whether the indigent has waived this right to seek appeal or
whether he has possibly been denied due process of law. Another
question that will probably arise in the future is whether an indigent has the right to assistance of counsel on appeal when there
is no appeal as of right.
Along with this question will come the problem of determining
just when, if at all, the indigent is entitled to this aid. Should the
assistance be offered to help the indigent seek the appeal, or should
it be withheld until he has secured the appeal on his own efforts?
Complete answers to these questions can only be found in future
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litigation. Perhaps one can look to Gideon v. Wainwright, supra,
Douglas v. California,supra, and Griffin v. Illinois, supra, as guidelines to what the answers to these questions may be. From these
cases it is seen that the Court is in favor of construing the Contitution so as to extend its protection to the indigent and to prevent
discrimination against him.
John I. Rogers, II

Creditors' Rights-Tort Liability for Fraudulent Conveyance
At the time P's judgment against D was entered by a New York
court, D owned real estate in Puerto Rico. D, the judgment debtor,
transferred this property to a third party. P claimed that D conveyed this property for the purpose of hindering and defrauding P in
the collection of his judgment. P brought this action for the damages
which resulted from D's alleged fraudulent transfer. D moved to
dismiss P's action on the ground that P had no lien on the property
transferred. Held, order denying the motion to dismiss affirmed.
At common law whenever one improperly interfered with the execution of a judgment he was liable for any damages he caused to
the judgment creditor. James v. Powell, 266 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1966).
Courts generally agree that a general creditor, without a lien,
cannot maintain an action for damages. This principle is based
upon the legal right of one to use, enjoy or dispose of his property
without restriction until some other person obtains an interest in
the property which the law will protect. The law determines the
time and manner in which the property of a debtor ceases to
be subject to his disposition and becomes subject to the interest of
his creditor. Adler -v.Fenton, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 407 (1860). The
dissent in the principal case stated that a general creditor or a
judgment creditor without a lien on specific property has no cause
of action against his debtor. This statement, in so far as it relates
to general creditors, is supported by numerous cases.
In Brunvold v. Victor Johnson & Co., 59 Cal. App. 2d 75, 138
P.2d 32 (1943), the court stated that it was settled law that no
tort liability exists against those participating in a fraudulent
transfer, at least where the creditor at the time of the transfer has
not reduced his claim to judgment and holds no lien upon the
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